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Among nominal-predicate sentences, sentences in which the subject is con-
nected with a nominal by a copula, some are considered to have rhetorical 
nature. For example, sentences (l)a-(l)c are, if unconsciously, interpreted 
beyond the so called literal meanings, hence their felicity. 
(1) a. A woman 1s a woman. 
b. Such a woman is not a woman. 
c. Juliet is the sun. 
Apparently, sentence (l)a, a kind of tautology, is senseless, while (l)b, a 
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To the contrary, (2), when uttered to inform someone of Tom's occupation, 
requires no more than literal interpretation. 
(2) Tom is a teacher. 
As regards (l)a-(l)c, where do their proper meanings come from? Is there 
any crucial difference in the process of understanding between these rhetorical 
sentences and ordinary ones like (2)? 
Grice(l975) argues that sentences like (l)a-(l)c are in fact lacking in proper 
meanings, but that the very fact that these kinds of sentences are uttered 
leads the hearer to guess the speaker's implicature, implicit meaning put in 
the utterance, and consequently they are properly interpreted. He, however, 
does not make clear how the implicatures are understood and what they are. 
Sperber(l975) and Sperber& Wilson(l986), in their analysis of metaphor and 
other rhetorical expressions, try to explain the hearer's process of understand-
ing with the newly introduced concept of relevance and give a proper suggestion 
that rhetorical nature of an utterance is a matter of degree. But they go the 
same line as Grice in the point of reducing the whole meaning to implicature. 
And tautology and oxymoron are not referred to. 
This paper discusses the above mentioned issue, taking tautology (here, 
sentences roughly in the form of'X is X'such as (l)a), oxymoron (here, 
sentences roughly in the form of'X is not X'such as (l)b), and metaphor ( 
here, sentences roughly in the form of'Y is X'such as (l)c) to examine. The 
approach taken here is characterized as follows: 1) to deal with the meaning of 
sentences with relation to human language understanding, 2) in this connec-
tion, to analyze the process in which sentences are understood, 3) to look into 
the difference and the similarity between the rhetorical sentences and ordinary 
ones, with a special focus on the meaning of the nominal predicate. 
In section 2, we begin with the analysis of tautology, which provides the 
fundamental idea for the issue. It is preceded by some preliminaries on lan-
guage understanding and knowledge. In section 3, oxymoron and metaphor 
are taken up in connection with tautology. In section 4, characteristics of 
the sentences in question are described in comparison with ordinary nominal— 
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predicate sentences. In section 5, summary and related issues are stated to 
conclude. 
2 An  Approach to Tautology 
2.1 Preliminaries: Language Understanding and Knowledge 
To start with, consider the following dialogue, which includes an example of 
tautology. 
(3) John: Oh, it's heavy! Would you bring anyone powerful? 
Mike: Sure. Mary was around here. I'l bring her. 
John: No. Not a woman. It's SO heavy. 
Mike: Don't you know her power? 
John: Not actually. But anyway, a woman is a woman. 
Mike: Well・・・, it might be true. / you'll see the answer. 
In (3), where power is the topic, the underlined part is interpreted as fol-
lows:'In general, a woman is weak in muscular power.(So is Mary.)'. How 
does this interpretation arise? Let us consider it with relation to language 
understanding. 
As language understanding has a close relation to knowledge, let us stop to 
think about the latter for a moment. Researches on knowledge representation 
in mind have been conducted in such fields as cognitive psychology and ar-
tificial intelligence. An effective theory on memory is schema theory. Let us 
overview it and a related notion frame, according to Greene(1990). 
Schema theory suggests that human memory consists of schemas, each of 
which holds the knowledge concerning a certain object or thing, to help our 
understanding of things, words and sentences through inference. And for the 
representation of schema, frame is proposed by Minsky,M. 
An example of a frame is shown in Fig.l: a frame is corresponding to a 
schema. In Fig.l, various kinds of knowledge about the category'DOG'is 
represented in an integrated fashion. A frame has some slots (boxes led by 
'ISA','HAS','TYPE', etc.), which in turn have their values (compulsory, 






ロニ arbitrary:spitz, … 
TYPE 
し—［二J arbitrary: big, small, 
SIZE very small, … 
COLORロニ arbitrary:black,brown, red, … 
Fig.I: Frame Knowledge of Category'DOG': cited from Greene(1990) 
default or arbitr匹 y).What is characteristic of a frame is the default value: it 
well explains such empirical facts as that hearing a story of a dog without any 
particular information on legs, the hearer assumes a four-leg dog. 
Then, what part of the frame knowledge in Fig.I could/should be reg四 ded
as the meaning of the word'dog'? Traditionally, the meaning of a word used 
to be regarded as the necessary and sufficient condition (i.e. intension) which 
would determine the extension (the set of those elements which are true of the 
word). Against this tradition, Putnam(1975) reg四 dedas part of the meaning 
of a word, in addition, the set of representative attributes which the extension 
of the word bears, calling it stereotype. Taking'water'as an example, he dealt 
with its stereotype - colorless, transparent, tasteless, thirst-quenching, etc. 
- as an important part of the meaning of the word. The essential point of 
Putnam's claim is that he took into consideration such knowledge which is 
needed for a proper understanding or use of it in a community l). 
1 Putnam(l975) describes stereotype as follows:'In ordinary parlance a'stereotype' 
is a conventional(frequently malicious) idea (which may be inaccurate) of what an 
X looks like or acts like or is.'(p.249) 
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From the perspective of language understanding, Putnam's claim on the 
meaning of a word is considered to be properer than the traditional one. In 
Putnam's idea, roughly speaking, most part of (if not the whole part of) frame 
knowledge as shown in Fig.l is included in the meaning of a word. Thus, in 
the following discussion as regards language understanding, we take the frame 
model 2). 
Now let us consider (3). The knowledge which the speaker John would have 
about categories'WOMAN'and'MAN', is modeled in Fig.2: it is based on the 
frame model, where schematic knowledge of a category is represented within 
a frame (the boxed area). 
category ► IX :WOMAN 
しi_nguisticknowledge —• V。:definition -x。:(intension) 
in a narrow sense) 1- Iv 1: physical -x 1 
related knowledge 
on the world 
strength 
V1 : power --X 1: ••••• 
V 12: toughness -X 12: ••••• 
V 13: quickness -X13 : ••••• 






• V1 --~X11 
Fig.2: Knowledge Representation of Categories'WOMAN'and'MAN' 
The way of knowledge representation in Fig.2, as a variant of a frame model, 
bears two major characteristics. First, two kinds of knowledge - linguistic 
knowledge in a narrow sense (the'meaning'of the word in the traditional 
approach) and related knowledge - are represented in a frame together. 
Taking the category'WOMAN'as an example, the former is the intension of 
the word'woman', namely the condition to determine its extension. In plain 
2The frame model is not perfect, as Lakoff(1987) points out, but it will do for our 
present discussion. 
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words, it is the knowledge responsible for judging whether a given object is 
a woman or not. On the other hand, related knowledge is an integration of 
generalized knowledge of women, which has been formed by learning3l. It 
consists of various kinds of knowledge, regardless of truthfulness or precision, 
including visual and audio data, fuzzy information, and even a kind of illusion 
or prejudice. It constructs an overall idea of what a woman is like. According 
to Putnam(1975)'s word, related knowledge as we call it is the knowledge 
about stereotype. It should be noted that members of a community share 
with one another this related knowledge, part of which is called common sense 
or social belief. 
Second, the whole knowledge of a category, the content of a frame, is repre-
sented as pairs of vie切pointsand the corresponding attributes in a hierarchical 
way4). Vie切pointhere stands for an aspect from which to grasp a category: 
we human beings see a physical object from different viewpoints to grasp the 
whole image of it, which seems to apply to abstract things. The distinction be-
tween Vo (for definition) and Vi(i = 1,…） (for stereotype) is important. For 
'WOMAN',X。(i.e.intension) is the biological features 5). Attribute, on the 
other hand, is the information of the category corresponding to a viewpoint. 
To say metaphorically, it is the image (namely, how the object looks) from 
the viewpoint. In some cases, attributes of different categories corresponding 
to a certain viewpoint together with make a total image: in Fig.2, those of 
categories'WOMAN'and'MAN'corresponding to the viewpoint'power'do. 
In addition to the structure of knowledge assumed above, we should think of 
the dynamic change of states of knowledge from a cognitive aspect. In a dis-
course, knowledge seems to be activated part by part according to the context, 
3Here,'learning'is used in a wider sense. It includes knowledge acquisition through 
experiences on the whole, not limited to that by reading or by being taught. 
4 Viewpoint and attribute here basically correspond to slot and value in Minsky's 
model (in Fig.l) respectively. 
5Yamanashi(l995) calls Vo and Vi(i = 1, ...)'central viewpoint'and'prototypical 
viewpoint'respectively. Furthermore, in my idea, even in such categories as'CUP', 
which seems to have no strict definition, some viewpoints have greater priority than 
others: this difference in priority is considered to contribute to the ordinary /rhetorical 
nature of a nominal predicate, as shown later. 
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judging from that we have only part of our knowledge in our consciousness at 
one moment. Therefore, it could be said that language understanding on acer-
tain point of time is dependent on how knowledge is activated on the speaker's 
and the hearer's sides. 
With these preliminaries, we will proceed to examine tautology'X is X'. 
2.2 Analysis 
Let us now return to example (3) in page 77 and analyze the underlined 
part. 
The dialogue proceeds in the following way. When Mary is・mentioned by 
Mike in the context where power is the topic, the image of'WOMAN'(the 
upper category of Mary) with reference to power is activated in John's mind. 
Accordingly, the relative weakness of a woman shown in Fig.2 comes into him, 
and he declines Mike's offer (in line 3). In response to Mike's implicit claim 
for Mary's power (in line 4), John again declines it uttering the underlined 
part (in line 5). Mike agrees or disagrees with him (in line 6). 
Now, let us have a close look at the underlined part,'a woman is a woman': 
what does each nominal'a woman'express? The first one, the subject, refers 
to an arbitrary element of the extension of category'WOMAN', which is to be 
predicated. While the second one, the nominal predicate, represents a certain 
attribute of category'WOMAN', in the analysis here. Indeed the predicate 
nominal in itself could represent the whole set of attributes or an arbitrary 
part of it, but taking the speaker's state of mind at the time of utterance 
into consideration, it seems to cover only the activated part, the part related 
to power. Consequently, by uttering the sentence'a woman is a woman', 
the speaker is referring to the generalized image of women with reference to 
power, namely, the relative weakness of a woman6l. Furthermore, the speaker, 
applying the generalized idea of the category to Mary, infers and implicitly 
claims Mary's weakness in particular. 
6The utterance presupposes that category'WOMAN'bears a certain characteristic 
attribute with reference to power. Otherwise, the predicate nominal would represent 
a null content, which doesn't make sense. 
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Then, how can the hearer Mike understand what's said properly? First of 
al, we can assume that the hearer shares, somewhat loosely, the knowledge 
shown in Fig.2 with the speaker. (In fact, as has been stated in 2.1, community 
members share with one another a variety of knowledge.) Second, needless to 
say, the speaker and the hearer share the context. Under these conditions, the 
underlined sentence being uttered, the hearer evokes from his own knowledge 
the image of a woman with reference to power, in accordance with the context. 
What's evoked in the hearer's mind can be identified with that in the speaker's 
mind, because they share the knowledge. Therefore, the hearer interprets the 
utterance as referring to the relative weakness of a woman. Furthermore, based 
on the fact that utterance was made in reference to Mary, the hearer should 
understand that Mary's weakness in particular has been inferred and claimed. 
2.3 Other examples 
Now let us think about some varieties of tautology, making reference to 
Fig.2. Suppose that'a man is a man'is uttered when John's power is in 
question. In this case, contrary to'a woman is a woman'in (3), the utterance 
would have such a meaning as'In general, a man is strong in muscular power. 
(So is John.)'. Suppose then that'a woman is a woman'is uttered when 
Mary's taste in accessories is in question. This time, unlike that in (3), the 
utterance would have such a meaning as'In general, a woman has a taste in 
accessories'. These examples indicate that'Xがin'X1is Xがrepresentsthe 
stereotypical attribute(s) of the category concerned in a given situation. 
Now see the following example. 
(4) I promised my friend that I would say nothing of the matter, and 
a promise 1s a promise. 
(C.Doyle, The crooked man: Sekiguchi(1962)) 
In (4), the underlined part is interpreted as follows, with little support by 
the context:'A promise should be kept, once it is made'. What accounts for 
this? It is analyzed this way: category'PROMISE'(or the word'promise') 
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has in itself a very limited number of attribute(s), so that alternatives of what 
could be represented by the predicate nominal are inevitably limited. To put 
it another way, the relative independence on the context seen in (4) is due to 
the limited attributes of the nominal. Nominals such as'rule'or'obligation', 
and modified nominals such as'what's over'or'cheap article'are considered 
to work in the same way. 
2.4 The Essence 
Now let us summarize what's been found so far. 
From the analysis, it could be claimed that in'X1 is X込'Xがisnot restricted 
to representing the intension of the word, which is linguistically determined in a 
narrow sense, but is free to represent various kinds of attributes of the category 
concerned, which is given by related knowledge as is shown in Fig.2, and that 
the actual content represented is specified by the context and knowledge in a 
dynamic way. In short, in the whole set of attributes of the category concerned 
(therefore, of the predicate nominal), which is semantically supposed, it is 
only a certain subset of it that is actually represented in a discourse. This is, 
as will be shown, the essential point to explain the felicity of utterances in 
question, common to the three types. 
According to Grice(1975),'Xがin'X1is Xがrepresentsnothing but the 
intension of the word, which is linguistically determined. Therefore the ut-
terance becomes inevitably meaningless. Our approach makes contrast with 
Grice's:'X1 is Xがmakessense due to the meaningfulness of X2, — before, or 
simultaneously with, or without the hearer's getting concious of its rhetorical 
nature. 
3 Oxymoron and Metaphor in Connection with Tautology 
On the basis of the above mentioned idea on tautology, we now have a look 
at oxymoron and metaphor. 
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3.1 Stereotype and the Rhetorical Expressions 
First, let us introduce a notion of stereotype set, based on that of stereotype. 
As has been stated in section 2.1, Putnam(l975) calls an integration of the 
representative attributes of a category stereotype. In this paper, the attribute 
in terms of a certain viewpoint - relative weakness of a woman with reference 
to power, for example - is called so. Furthermore, stereotype is also used 
for such an element which bears the stereotypical attribute. We now define 
stereotype set as follows: 
(5) The stereotype set of a category X is the set of those elements of X 
which bears the representative attributes of X , in terms of the'tempo-
rary viewpoint', defined as an integration of viewpoint(s) temporarily 
concerned (henceforth Vtcrnp). And Xtcm.p is the representative at-
tribute corresponding to Vtcm.p• 
Tautology'X is X'is to describe an arbitrary element of the extension 7) of 
the category concerned as an element of its stereotype set. 
Next we introduce the notion of oxymoron set as follows: 
(6) The oxymoron set of a category X is the set of those elements of 
X which does not bear the representative attributes of X , in terms of 
Ytcmp• 
It is, accordingly, the compliment of the stereotype set as regards the cat-
egory. Oxymoron is to refer to an element of oxymoron set. Consider the 
following dialogue, which includes a pair of oxymoron and tautology. 
(7) John: Ah・・・,I'm disgusted with Mary's rough speech. 
Such a ;;oman is not a woman! 
7It can be considered that in tautology, the subject is the generic element of the 
category, while in oxymoron and metaphor, the subject is specific one. In such an 
example of tautology as'Alain Delon is Alain Delon, however old he might become', 
we consider the subject'Alain Delon', a specific person, to be the unique element of 
the category'Alain Delon', thus the generic element of it. 
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Mike: A woman is a woman, however rough her speech is. Indeed, Mary 
is warm-hearted and, kind of delicate. 
In (7), John suggests uttering an oxymoron that Mary cannot be regarded 
as a woman in terms of the way she speakes. Here, Vte1n1, is'speech'. The 
predicate nominal'a woman'represents the stereotypical attribute of category 
'WOMAN'in Vte1np• In response to John, Mike claims that even such a 
woman who is not a stereotype in Vtemp can bear the stereotypical attribute 
in another viewpoint: this time, the predicate nominal'a woman'represents 
the attribute corresponding to the newly introduced viewpoint. The speaker 
is switching the viewpoint from'speech'to more essential one along with the 
utterance. 
In the same line, let us introduce the notion of metaphor set as follows. 
(8) The metaphor set of a category X is the set of those elements out of 
X which bears the representative (or stereotypical) attributes of X ( 
that is, Xtemp) in terms of V temp. 
Thus, in our approach, the set of elements which bear the attribute Xtem.p 
consists of stereotype set and metaphor set exclusively. Metaphor8) is to de-
scribe an element of metaphor set. Let us see just one example, which is same 
as (l)c. 
(9) Juliet is the sun. 
In (9), the predicate nominal'the sun'is considered to represent such at-
tributes as warmness, brightness or indispensableness, which are shared with 
Juliet. It is true that these attributes of Juliet are different from those of the 
sun in quality9l, but apart from the necessary adjustment,'the sun'itself is 
8Here, we are just concerned with metaphor of copula sentences with a predicate 
nominal, and the main focus is put on its relationship with tautology and oxymoron. 
Investigation into a variety of metaphor is beyond the scope of this paper. 
9For example, warmness as regards Juliet has nothing to do with temparature: it 
means the mental one or the impression drawn from her. Thus, to be precise, the 
similarity itself would be understood through a kind of calculation. 
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considered to represent the sun's attribute Xtem.p, an integration of the at-
tributes corresponding to Vtcmp 10). In short, in metaphor'Y is X', a certain 
set of attributes of the category, i.e. Xtemp, is represented by the predicate 
nominal, as in tautology. 
3.2 Mutual Relationship 
Through sections 2 and 3, the essential idea about tautology, oxymorpn 
and metaphor has been stated, with special reference to what their predicate 
nominals represent. 
In tautology, the extension of the category X (written in italic to distinguish 
from the literal expression'X') is identified with its stereotype set. That is, 
elements outside the stereotype set are neglected. In oxymoron, to the contrary, 
those elements are in focus to describe. In metaphor, such an element outside 
the extension of the category X but bearing the attribute of X is described. 













Fig.3: Sets in Relation to Tautology, Oxymoron and Metaphor 
The following two factors together with account for the felicity of the rhetor-
ical expressions in question —tautology, oxymoron and metaphor: 1) the 
10In (9), Vtemp and Xtem.p are understood rather context-independently, as m (4). 
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variety of the context-dependent attribute Xtcmp and 2) the discrepancy be-
tween the extension of the category X and the set of those elements which 
bear Xtcmp• Common to these expressions, the predicate nominal represents 
Xtemp• 
4 Characteristics of the Rhetorical Use 
Now we summarize the characteristics of the predicate nominal of rhetorical 
sentences as in (l)a -(l)c in comparison with that of ordinary ones as in 
(2). The similarity is described as follows: the predicate nominal represents 
a certain attribute(s) of the category concerned in terms of the temporary 
viewpoint. While the difference is described as follows: 
(10) As for an ordinary sentence, the attribute represented, i.e. Xtcmp, is the 
intension of the category, i.e. X。,which is linguistically determined and 
has priority over the other attributes. 
On the other hand, 邸 fora rhetorical sentence, Xtcmp varies among the 
attributes of the category. In most c邸 esof tautology and in al c邸 esof 
oxymoron and metaphor, Xtemp is not the intension X。buta certain 
representative (or stereotypical) attribute(s), i.e. Xi(i = 1…)， given 
by related knowledge. As for such a tautology in which Xtcmp is X。,it 
should be, unlike those of ordinary sentences, preceded by an oxymoron 
where Xtcmp isふ (notX。)and bears meaning owing to the speaker's 
illocutionary act of switching the viewpoints. 
In a rhetorical sentence, the actual attribute represented is understood de-
pending on the context and the shared knowledge, as has been indicated. That 
the rhetorical use of a nominal could seem somewhat strange is just because 
it is not the use in a default situation, i.e. the use in the highest priority. It 
should be noted that the attribute Xtemp represented in the rhetorical use is 
none the less part of the meaning of the nominal, if we take such knowledge 
representation as in Fig.2. Therefore it would be inappropriate to reduce al 
the meanings of the rhetorical nominals (accordingly, of rhetorical sentences 
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in question) to implicature, as Grice(1975) does. Rhetorical nature of the 
predicate nominal would be due to the lower priority originally put on the 
currently represented attribute, among the whole attributes, and would be a 
1) matter of degree . 
It may be worth pointing out, in passing, that the forms of tautology, o:i:y-
moron and metaphor work effectively to express the nuance of the utterance. 
The utterance of tautology with strong orientation to the stereotypical idea is 
well symbolized by the form of apparent self-evidence. As for that of oxymoron 
with emphasis on the exceptional element, by the form of apparent contradic-
tion. And that of metaphor with creative association, by the form of apparent 
improbability. These forms, however, just play a role in symbolization: they 
never reflect the meanings of the sentences in a straightfoward way. 
5 Concluding remarks 
In this paper, the meanings of rhetorical sentences - tautology, oxymoron 
and metaphor in particular - and their mutual relationship have been studied 
in relation to human language understanding, with special focus on that of 
the predicate nominal. It is claimed that the predicate nominal represents 
the stereotypical attribute(s) of the category concerned context-dependently, 
and that there is a discrepancy between the extension of a category and the 
set of such elements as bearing its stereotypical attribute(s), due to which the 
sentence becomes meaningful and felicitous. The approach taken here owes a 
lot to the way of knowledge representation, which has been helpful enough for 
the present purpose but stil remains to be elaborated for a further study 12). 
11This claim of gradience matches Sperber(1975)'s suggestion. 
12In such an utterance as'You are a lily in the valley', the knowledge of the nominal 
'a lily in the valley'is considered to be dynamically created or guided out of rather 
static knowledge like that of'a woman'. 
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